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Abstract
There has been great focus in the recent trade theory literature on the introduction
of ﬁrm heterogeneity into trade models. However, these models tend to rely heavily
on symmetry assumptions and assume melting iceberg transport costs as the only
form of trade restrictions. Moreover, a standard assumption is that ﬁrms diﬀer across
marginal cost, yet empirical evidence suggests this is not the only important source
of heterogeneity. I provide a highly tractable model, in which ﬁrms diﬀer across ﬁxed
costs, that qualitatively maintains the main results of these models, but allows for
asymmetric changes in trade restrictions, a necessary step towards studying strategic
trade policy. In addition, I highlight the diﬀerences in the eﬀects on product variety
associated with changes in an ad valorem tariﬀ, iceberg transport costs, and additional
beachhead costs to become an exporter. This is important as there are potential
oﬀsetting eﬀects on ﬁrm entry.
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11 Introduction
There has been great focus in the recent trade theory literature on the introduction of ﬁrm
heterogeneity into trade models. Beginning with Melitz (2003) and Jean (2002), one of
this literature’s key results is that increased trade restrictions lead to increases in average
productivity for exporters and decreases in average productivity for domestic ﬁrms. This
stems from increased trade barriers leading the least productive exporters to revert to only
sales in their own markets, the reduced competition from which permits entry by the least
productive domestic ﬁrms. These models, along with Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004),
Yeaple (2005), and Baldwin and Forslid (2006), have provided a huge advancement in the
literature on intra-industry trade since its conception with Krugman (1979, 1980). However,
these gains come at the cost of restrictive symmetry assumptions. In this paper, I provide
a more tractable model that maintains the key results of Melitz (2003) yet allows for more
ﬂexibility in the analysis.
In particular, whereas these papers commonly model trade restrictions by symmetric
iceberg transport costs, my approach allows me to both analyze additional types of trade
barriers and to allow such costs to diﬀer.1 These features are important for several reasons.
First, although iceberg trade costs are equivalent to ad valorem tariﬀs in some settings,
they are not equivalent in the case of monopolistic competition. Therefore one cannot take
the lessons learned from the existing literature and blindly apply them to the changes in
tariﬀs. Furthermore, tariﬀs generate income for the importer at the expense of the exporter
whereas iceberg costs are modeled as pure losses, which has implications for aggregate welfare
analysis. In addition, the evidence of Hummels and Skiba (2004) ﬁnds that a per-unit
transport cost is more consistent with the data than iceberg costs (conﬁrming the Alchian-
Allen hypothesis).2
1“Iceberg” transport costs are deﬁned as a ﬁrm needing to ship more than one unit of good in order for
one unit to arrive; the additional units “melt” away.
2Alchian and Allen (1964) hypothesize that transport costs lead ﬁrms to export only high-quality goods,
leaving lower-quality goods for home consumption.
2Second, it is true that symmetric trade costs simplify the analysis a great deal and
are a reasonable assumption when dealing with transport costs since the distance between
countries is the same regardless of the country of origin. Furthermore, one might expect
that diﬀerences in fueling and other miscellaneous shipping costs would be minor. However,
due to taxes on fuel and other regulatory diﬀerences, the cost of getting from A to B need
not equal those of getting from B to A. Similarly, while symmetric changes in tariﬀs might
be reasonable between members of the World Trade Organization by rules of reciprocity,
this does not necessarily apply to trade policy changes between members and non-members.
Third, in order to analyze strategic trade policy, it is necessary to derive best responses, a
task which requires analysis of asymmetric tariﬀs. While the models of Melitz and others
certainly have their uses, their complexity does not allow them to be used to study these
issues in a tractable way.
In addition to the typical barriers to trade (tariﬀs and transport costs), I am able to
consider the eﬀect of “foreign beachhead costs”, that is, those ﬁxed costs necessary to engage
in exporting.3 This is often a minor consideration, but with the rapid technological growth
and service industries being created to facilitate business operations, these beachhead costs
are becoming increasingly important. Thomas Friedman explains in his book, The World
is Flat, “...UPS also has a ﬁnancing arm – UPS Capital – that will put up the money for
the transformation of your supply chain, particularly if you are a small business and don’t
have the capital...UPS is creating enabling platforms for anyone to take his or her business
global or vastly improve the eﬃciency of his or her global supply chain” (p. 173). This has
direct implications for these beachhead costs and needs to be considered in conjunction with
investigating changes in other trade restrictions, as they may have conﬂicting results.
To move in this direction, this paper makes several key modiﬁcations to the basic model
that greatly ease the analysis of a situation with heterogeneous ﬁrms and endogenous entry.
Among these are changes to the utility function of the representative consumer that reduce
3The term ‘beachhead’ costs was coined by Baldwin (1988).
3so-called income feedback eﬀects and an assumption of ﬁxed cost heterogeneity rather than
variable cost heterogeneity. Although the latter is not necessary for the main results, it does
aid greatly in simplifying the analysis. Moreover, recent data analysis suggests ﬁxed cost
heterogeneity is needed to explain a ﬁrm’s decision of where to export. For instance, Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2007), using a Melitz-type model calibrated to a French data set,
illustrate the need for ﬁrm and market speciﬁc shocks to the ﬁxed cost of entry to match
the data. Furthermore, Lawless and Whelan (2008) reiterate the importance of variation in
ﬁxed and variable trade costs across ﬁrms in explaining trade ﬂows for Irish owned ﬁrms.
Additionally, as Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder (2008) point out, ﬁxed cost heterogeneity is more
appropriate with so-called “original brand name manufacturers” that diﬀer in the power of
their brand name – a result of marketing and other ﬁxed cost activities.
With the changes I employ, it is relatively simple to undertake tasks such as determining
the welfare impact of opening up for (even limited) trade, deriving the eﬀect of changes in
trade barriers on productivity, and contrasting the impact of the various trade barriers on
the number of varieties.4 It is worth noting that for some of these, qualitatively similar
results have been found by others. Nevertheless, my model allows for both the exploration
of new issues (such as the relative impact of various trade barriers) as well as a more simple
derivation of the pre-existing results.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and characterizes the equi-
librium. Section 3 analyzes the results and compares the model to the existing literature.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two countries labeled ? and ?. Each country is endowed with ¯ 𝐿 units of labor
which is the sole factor of production. Without loss of generality, let ¯ 𝐿? ≥ ¯ 𝐿?. There are two
4The number of varieties has an obvious theoretical impact on welfare. Additionally, Broda and Weinstein
(2006) show that growth in product variety has been an important source of gains from trade in the U.S.
from 1972-2001.
4sectors. Sector 1 is the numeraire and consists of a homogeneous good (?) that is produced
under constant returns to scale, freely traded, and sold in a perfectly competitive market.
Sector 2 consists of a continuum of heterogeneous goods, each variety of which is indexed by
?. As is standard in the Melitz-type model, this is produced under increasing returns to scale
in a monopolistically competitive market with free entry. Unlike sector 1, this market may
face both transportation costs and tariﬀ barriers. With the exception of the diﬀering labor
endowments and tariﬀ rates, countries are identical. Therefore, analyzing the situation for
country ? informs us of the analogous situation for country ?.
2.1 Sector 1
The price of ? is normalized to 1 in each market. Assuming that one unit of labor is needed
for production, this will normalize the wage in each country to unity. Finally, I assume that
in equilibrium a positive amount of ? is produced in each country.
2.2 Consumers
The representative consumer in country ? has quasi-linear preferences with an embedded
Dixit-Stiglitz utility function which displays love for variety over the heterogeneous good;







, 𝜇 > 0 (1)
where 𝜀 = 1/(1 − 𝗼) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, 𝑁? is the total mass of varieties
in country ?, and ?𝑦? denotes aggregate consumption of the numeraire. Note that although
it is tempting to interpret ?𝑥? as aggregate consumption of the heterogeneous good, it is
not. This is the ﬁrst departure from the standard Melitz-type model, and is done for speciﬁc
reasons. Quasi-linear utility will isolate the decision whether to become an exporter or not
without any income feedback eﬀects; providing a model that allows for asymmetric changes
in trade restrictions (e.g. unilateral tariﬀ policy) to be easily analyzed. Moreover, this
5speciﬁcation allows me to compare the diﬀerences between an ad valorem tariﬀ and iceberg
trade costs on productivity and variety without having to account for the income eﬀects of
the tariﬀ or the “wasteful” costs of iceberg transport costs. Finally, I assume that income
in each country is suﬃciently large that both ? and ? goods are consumed.
Consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraint:
∫ 𝑁𝑘
0
𝑝?(?)??(?)𝑑? + ?𝑦? ≤ 𝐼? (2)
where 𝑝?(?) is the price of variety ? and 𝐼? is aggregate income in country ?.5 The solution









0 𝑝?(?)??(?)𝑑? = 𝜇 by virtue of the quasi-linear preferences.
2.3 Heterogeneous Firms
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs. At time zero, every entrepreneur is given a unique
draw that indexes its variety and productivity type. Once the entrepreneur is aware of her
type, she decides two things; whether to create a ﬁrm and where to sell. If a ﬁrm is created,
it must incur a ﬁxed cost measured in units of labor. This cost is referred to as a ‘beachhead’
cost and can be interpreted as forming a distribution and servicing network. It is indexed by
?, and will be dependent on the market(s) being served by the ﬁrm. Subsequent production
exhibits constant returns to scale with labor as the only factor of production. The unit-labor
requirement for a ﬁrm is normalized to one.
This is the second departure from the standard Melitz-type model which assumes ﬁrms
are heterogeneous across marginal cost and draw their type from a probability distribution
5Recall that under perfect competition, the price of 𝑦 is equal to one.
6with certain probability of “death”.6 Marginal cost heterogeneity complicates the analysis
a great deal and will have similar qualitative results to that of ﬁxed cost heterogeneity. In
addition, as Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2007) and Lawless and Whelan (2008) suggest,
ﬁxed cost heterogeneity is an important consideration for the real world. I do not claim to
be the ﬁrst to employ ﬁxed cost heterogeneity; Davies and Eckel (2007) do so in studying
tax competition with endogenous entry, and Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder (2006, 2008) use ﬁxed
export cost heterogeneity to show that a reciprocal reduction of small tariﬀs reduces welfare.
There are two available markets for a potential ﬁrm, each with a corresponding ﬁxed
cost. A ﬁrm can choose to serve only the domestic market and pay 𝑓(?) or it can choose to
additionally serve the foreign market through exports and pay an extra 𝗾𝑓(?).7 I assume that
𝗾 > 1; 𝑓′(?) > 0 and 𝑓′′(?) ≥ 0 denote the ﬁrst and second derivatives respectively. Thus,
entrepreneurs with higher ability correspond to a lower index ?. These ﬁxed cost diﬀerences
are the source of ﬁrm heterogeneity. A ﬁrm, therefore, faces the following menu of ﬁxed costs
(measured in units of labor):8
Table 1: Fixed Cost Menu
Firm Type Fixed Cost
domestic only 𝑓(?)
domestic and exporter (1 + 𝗾)𝑓(?)
Goods that are exported from country ? to country ? are subject to melting-iceberg
transport costs, 𝜎 ≥ 1, where a ﬁrm must ship 𝜎 units in order for one unit to arrive
at its destination. I assume that transport costs are symmetric and thus omit country
6Typically, the Pareto distribution is used to ﬁnd speciﬁc examples. Though entrepreneur types are not
determined stochastically, the mapping from one’s type to a ﬁrm’s ﬁxed cost is general enough to mimic
certain distributions. For instance, a distribution that yielded a large mass of “high” types (i.e. very eﬃcient
ﬁrms) could be accounted for with a mapping that increases very slowly.
7Note that with wages equal to 1, these are equivalent to labor requirements for setting up ﬁrm activities.
8Constant expenditure on the heterogeneous good in each country (equal to 𝜇), along with identical
technologies and entrepreneurs implies that the condition 𝗾 > 1 is suﬃcient to insure a ﬁrm that serves the
foreign market will also serve the domestic market.
7subscripts.9 I do not investigate the eﬀect of a per-unit transport cost; since marginal
costs are normalized to one, this would have the same eﬀect as iceberg transport costs.10
Additionally, an exporting ﬁrm from country ? is subject to an ad valorem tariﬀ 𝜏?, where
I deﬁne 𝑡? ≡ 1 + 𝜏?. Furthermore, I assume that a government is unable to distinguish a
particular ﬁrm’s type, so any tariﬀ is an across-the-board tariﬀ applied to all exporters. Note
that tariﬀs can diﬀer across countries.
The decision to become a ﬁrm and which market to service depends on the associated
proﬁt for each type. Recall that the numeraire yields wages equal to one in both countries,
thus the operating proﬁts from serving the domestic market are
𝜋
?
𝐷(?) = 𝑝?(?)𝑞?(?) − 𝑞?(?) − 𝑓(?). (4)
Given the nature of monopolistic competition, the price will be a constant mark-up over
marginal cost and be equal to 1
𝗼. From market clearing, set 𝑞?(?) = ??(?), and the ﬁrm has
the following proﬁt function for supplying to the domestic market only:
𝜋
?



















is the aggregate price index of the heterogeneous
good.
Since preferences are identical across both countries, it follows that the total expendi-
ture on the heterogeneous good is equal to 𝜇 in both markets. Furthermore, recall that
technologies and the mass of entrepreneurs are also identical across countries. This, along
9This assumption is only done for notational ease. In order to investigate asymmetric changes in transport
costs, on need only add a country subscript to 𝜎.
10This is not the case when ﬁrms diﬀer across marginal costs.
8with 𝗾 > 1, is suﬃcient to ensure that a ﬁrm that exports will always serve the domestic
market. Thus, the decision to become an exporter stems purely from the additional proﬁts
from serving the foreign market. The proﬁt from exports for the ﬁrm in country ? exporting






1−𝜀?? − 𝗾𝑓(?). (6)
Note that since the iceberg transport cost only aﬀects marginal cost, this is passed through
onto the consumer in the price. That is, the price of a good produced in country ?, but
sold in country ? is 𝑝?
? = 𝜎
𝗼. Moreover, since ﬁrms take the aggregate price index as given,
the tariﬀ is also completely passed through onto the consumer, but done so diﬀerently than
iceberg transport costs.11 This diﬀerence may be a bit confusing. It has been a typical
conception that iceberg transportation costs have identical results as an ad valorem tariﬀ,
and in some respects that still holds true for monopolistic competition; the price consumers
pay is identical in both scenarios and the quantity demanded is the same. However, because
in monopolistic competition, the price is equal to a constant markup over marginal cost, the
amount paid in tariﬀs is also a constant markup over the “tax” paid in iceberg transportation
costs. Therefore, the marginal cost associated with an ad valorem tariﬀ is greater than that
of iceberg transportation costs.12
2.4 Equilibrium
Firms will enter each market as long as there are positive proﬁts, that is, until equations (5)
and (6) are driven to zero. Thus, deﬁne the cut-oﬀ ﬁrms as the ﬁrms that draw the values
11This claim is shown in Appendix A.
12Note that, in perfect competition, price equals marginal cost and the standard result of iceberg costs
having the same eﬀect as an ad valorem tariﬀ still holds.
9in the index (?) that solves the following equalities:
?? = 𝑓(??𝐷) (7)
??
𝗾𝑡𝜀
?𝜎𝜀−1 = 𝑓(??𝑋) (8)
?? = 𝑓(??𝐷) (9)
??
𝗾𝑡𝜀
?𝜎𝜀−1 = 𝑓(??𝑋) (10)
The indices ??𝐷 and ??𝐷 represent the ﬁrms that are indiﬀerent between producing the het-
erogeneous good and not producing at all in country ? and ? respectively. The indices ??𝑋
and ??𝑋 represent the ﬁrms that are indiﬀerent between serving both the domestic and for-
eign markets and serving only the domestic market. Furthermore, the terms on the left-hand
side of the equalities represent the variable proﬁt for a particular ﬁrm and are functions of
the total mass of ﬁrms (domestic and foreign).
Figure 1 illustrates the proﬁts of ﬁrms in country ? including those who export and those
who only sell domestically, assuming that the function 𝑓(?) is linear. It can be seen that
the greater the index ?, the greater the ﬁxed cost to enter a market, and thus the lower the
proﬁts. The intersection with the horizontal axis represents the index in which proﬁts are
zero for operating in that particular market. Note that the line representing export proﬁts
deﬁnes the proﬁts from exporting in addition to serving the domestic market. In other
words, ﬁrms with an index ? ∈ [0,??𝑋] make proﬁts from exporting and serving the domestic
market, and ﬁrms with an index ? ∈ (??𝑋,??𝐷] make proﬁts from only serving the domestic
market. Firms with an index ? > ??𝐷 do not produce.
After careful inspection of the equilibrium conditions, it can be seen that this is, in fact,
two systems of two equations and two unknowns: equations (7) and (10) and equations (8)
and (9).13 Moreover, due to the symmetry it is suﬃcient to only focus on one country. I will
focus on the output market in country ?, and thus equations (7) and (10). For future use, it









Dom. only No production Export + Dom.
Figure 1: Proﬁts from production in country ? with free trade










Although, I cannot explicitly solve for the cutoﬀ values without assuming a functional form
of the ﬁxed cost mapping 𝑓(?), I am still able to characterize the comparative statics. Totally










































































The term 𝗿(?) represents the elasticity of ﬁxed costs with respect to the index ?, evaluated
at ?. Equations (13) through (15) represent the eﬀect of changes in trade restrictions (either
through a tariﬀ, transport cost, or foreign beachhead cost) on the cutoﬀ ﬁrm serving the
foreign market. It follows that increases in trade restrictions decreases this cutoﬀ, or in other
words the mass of exporting ﬁrms has decreased. By decreasing the mass of exporting ﬁrms,
there is now less competition in the domestic market and the foreign ﬁrms still producing
are now charging a higher price relative to domestic producers. This decreased competition
makes being a domestic ﬁrm more proﬁtable, thus increasing the mass of domestic ﬁrms
– illustrated by equations (16) through (18). The fact that increased trade restrictions, in
general, have these results is not surprising given the results of Melitz (2003) and Helpman,
Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). What is important, and will be elaborated on further in proceed-
ing sections, is that diﬀerent trade restrictions correspond to diﬀerent magnitudes in ﬁrm
12cutoﬀ changes. This is a new result stemming from my more ﬂexible model.
3.1 Average Productivity
One key result from the standard model is that exposure to trade increases average domestic
ﬁrm productivity. This is done by less eﬃcient domestic ﬁrms exiting the market as com-
petition increases from the existence of foreign ﬁrms. This result rings true in my model
as well (as seen from equations (16) - (18)), though with a slightly diﬀerent interpretation.
Unlike the standard Melitz-type model, where average productivity is deﬁned as the average
amount of labor needed to actually produce one unit of output, average productivity here
is deﬁned at the total labor usage (including ﬁxed cost) per unit of output.14 As trade re-
strictions decrease, whether by lowering tariﬀs, iceberg transport costs, or foreign beachhead
cost (represented by 𝗾𝑓(?)), less eﬃcient (in terms of a higher ﬁxed cost to enter) domestic
ﬁrms exit. Thus, with the least eﬃcient domestic ﬁrms exiting, the average productivity of
remaining ﬁrms increases.
3.2 Moving from Autarky to Trade
In addition to the eﬀect trade has on average ﬁrm productivity, the now standard Melitz
(2003) model found additional important implications that trade has on ﬁrms and overall
welfare. I address these results in the following two sections.
3.2.1 Exporter Proﬁt and Market Share
Melitz (2003) found that “only a portion of the ﬁrms–the more eﬃcient ones–reap beneﬁts
from trade in the form of gains in market share and proﬁt” (p. 1719). My model yields
a comparable result. Furthermore, since I am comparing this model to that of the Melitz-
type, I will only consider the case with symmetric iceberg transport costs (𝜎) and set tariﬀs
equal to zero (𝑡? = 1). Since I am considering symmetric changes in iceberg transport costs,
14Recall that ﬁxed costs are measured in units of labor.
13the equilibrium cutoﬀs will be identical in each country. Thus, for notational ease, I deﬁne
??𝑋 = ??𝑋 = ?𝑋, and ??𝐷 = ??𝐷 = ?𝐷 for this section. Furthermore, let a superscript ? denote
autarky and ? denote trade.
When countries open up to trade, there is increased competition and domestic proﬁts
decrease. However, some domestic ﬁrms are eﬃcient enough to sell and make proﬁts abroad.
It is apparent that less eﬃcient ﬁrms lose proﬁt from opening to trade. What is not readily
apparent is whether the new proﬁts from exporting are greater than the loss in domestic
proﬁts for the more eﬃcient ﬁrms. Thus, a ﬁrm who will choose to export in trade will gain
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(+) (−)
It is important to note that not all exporting ﬁrms will gain, since the least eﬃcient
exporting ﬁrm (the ﬁrm with the index ?𝑋) makes zero proﬁts abroad. However, if the most
eﬃcient ﬁrm (the ﬁrm with the index 0) is made better oﬀ from trade, then by continuity
there must be a positive mass of ﬁrms better oﬀ from trade. This will depend on the
functional form of 𝑓(?), the entry(exiting) decision of exporting(pure domestic) ﬁrms, and
the level of trade restrictions – in this case, iceberg transport cost. I provide a simple proof
in Appendix B illustrating the ambiguous eﬀect trade has on ﬁrm proﬁts. This departure
from Melitz is due mainly from ﬁrms diﬀering across ﬁxed cost and not marginal cost. When
ﬁrms are heterogeneous across marginal cost, the most eﬃcient ﬁrm realizes higher revenue
relative to every other ﬁrm because it charges a lower price and consequently faces a higher
level of demand. However, in my model ﬁrms charge the same price and thus receive the
same level of revenue as every other ﬁrm in existence.
This highlights an interesting distinction from the Melitz (2003) model in the context of
15This form follows from the equilibrium conditions (7) and (10).
14the political economy. In the standard model where some ﬁrms gain proﬁts in the presence
of trade, there would exist ﬁrms lobbying for more open trade. Yet in my model, depending
on the functional form of the ﬁxed cost mapping, this gain to certain producers is absent,
further driving a wedge between maximizing consumer and producer surplus. The magnitude
of such a wedge is an important investigation for the political economy literature.
Melitz (2003) also ﬁnds that the most eﬃcient ﬁrms would lose domestic market share
from opening up to trade, but this loss would be outweighed by the gains in foreign market
share. This holds true in my model as well.
Proposition 1. The gain in foreign market share of a ﬁrm that becomes an exporter is
greater than the loss in domestic market share when going from autarky to trade.
Proof. The domestic market share of a ﬁrm that exports is the individual ﬁrm demand


































































Comparing this with the market share of the same ﬁrm in autarky, it follows that the gain in





























Increased welfare from trade is the cornerstone of international economics. Does my model
maintain this critical result? Again, I will only consider the case with symmetric iceberg
transport costs (𝜎) and set tariﬀs equal to zero (𝑡? = 1) to compare my model to Melitz
(2003). The following proposition illustrates that this critical result is maintained in my
model as well.
Proposition 2. A country will experience an increase in welfare from trade.
Proof. See Appendix B.
3.3 Additional Results
In this section, I clarify results similar to that of the existing literature and provide further
results not previously explored. In terms of the eﬀects of trade restrictions on product
variety, there is less consensus in the literature. In Melitz (2003), the eﬀect on the total
mass of varieties in a particular country is left ambiguous. Baldwin and Forslid (2006)
address this issue and ﬁnd that increased trade restrictions, in fact, have a counterintuitive
pro-variety eﬀect for the importing country. However, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) ﬁnd
that increased trade restrictions have an anti-variety eﬀect. In all three models (as in most
models dealing with such issues), trade restrictions are modeled as the standard iceberg
transportation cost.16 The corresponding eﬀects on the mass of varieties in country ? (Note
that 𝑁? = ??𝐷 + ??𝑋) are as follows:
16Though the main focus of this literature is on the eﬀects of changes in iceberg transportation costs, these
papers do investigate changes of foreign beachhead costs as well (𝗾𝑓(𝑖) in my model) – with the exception of
Meltiz and Ottaviano (2008) where beachhead costs are omitted for increased tractability. To my knowledge
Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder (2006, 2008), and Demidova and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2007) are the only papers to use







1 + 𝗼𝗿(??𝑋) − (𝑡?𝜎)





























The model presented here is consistent with the existing literature just mentioned, in that
the eﬀect on variety is ambiguous (i.e. the signs of equations (20) and (21)). I provide
conditions in which there is an associated anti-variety eﬀect here.
The following proposition pins down the condition that ensures an anti-variety eﬀect
associated with increases in iceberg transport costs.
Proposition 3. There is an anti-variety eﬀect associated with increases in iceberg transport





Proof. Proof is by direct calculation.
This is a suﬃcient and necessary condition. A more restrictive condition for an anti-variety
eﬀect, although one that is perhaps more intuitive, is if the elasticity of 𝑓(?) with respect
to the index is nondecreasing in ?. Examples would include both linear, exponential, and
power functions of ?. There is a similar result regarding tariﬀs and will be discussed further
shortly.
The next proposition addresses the decision to use iceberg transport costs to addition-
ally proxy for tariﬀ policy. There is an important distinction between the forms of trade




















17The variable proﬁt is more elastic with respect to tariﬀs than iceberg transport costs. The
diﬀerent eﬀects then feed into diﬀerent changes in variety.
Proposition 4. If 𝗼𝑡? ≤ 𝜎 and
∂𝑁𝑘
∂𝜎 < 0, then there is an anti-variety eﬀect associated with
an increase in the tariﬀ and this eﬀect is greater in magnitude than the anti-variety eﬀect
associated with an increase in iceberg transport costs.












𝜓 > 0 and
Ψ ≡ (𝜎 − 𝗼𝑡?)[1 − (𝑡?𝜎)




From Proposition 3, it follows that
1 + 𝗿(??𝑋) < (𝑡?𝜎)
𝗼𝜀[1 + 𝗿(??𝐷)].
Therefore,




This proposition, in conjunction with Proposition 3, implies that if there is an anti-variety
eﬀect associated with iceberg transport costs, for at least certain parameter values, there will
be an anti-variety eﬀect – of greater magnitude – associated with an increase in tariﬀs. In
addition, I can ﬁnd some interesting results in a second special case, where 𝜎 = 𝑡?.
Proposition 5. Evaluated at the same level, the eﬀect of a change in tariﬀ (𝑡?) on the mass
of varieties is less (or more negative) than the eﬀect of a change in ice-berg costs (𝜎) when
𝜎 = 𝑡?.



































       
𝜎=𝑡𝑘=𝜌
.
This result leads to an interesting observation. The diﬀerence between the variety eﬀects
associated with changes in an ad valorem tariﬀ and iceberg costs, exactly equals that of a
change in 𝗾 divided by 𝜌. That is
∂𝑁?
∂𝜏?
   





   









   
   
𝜎=𝑡𝑘=𝜌
.
Though it is perhaps unrealistic to assume all three exogenous variables share the same
value, this does highlight potential oﬀsetting eﬀects. The existing literature has investigated
the eﬀects of individual types of trade liberalization/restrictions. This model allows for
easily comparison of these eﬀects. These potential dampening/magnifying eﬀects on variety
is an important consideration for tariﬀ policy given recent increases in transportation cost
(primarily through higher fuel prices) and decreases in costs to become an exporter (primarily
through increases in computing technologies).
Propositions 4 and 5 do not ensure that the iceberg transport costs have a qualitatively
diﬀerent result than that of an ad valorem tariﬀ. However, in conjunction with Proposition
3, it is possible to have a pro-variety eﬀect associated with an increase in transportation costs
and an anti-variety eﬀect associated with an increased tariﬀ. In this scenario – assuming
transport costs are increasing – if a country is solely concerned with the welfare properties
of product variety, the government could raise its tariﬀ and realize little changes in total
product variety. Similarly, the government could lower tariﬀ levels and experience a greater
than expected increase in total product variety. In the case where both trade restrictions
19have an anti-variety eﬀect, these results would be reversed.
4 Conclusion
I have provided a tractable model of intra-industry trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms that
maintains the key results of the existing literature. The use of ﬁxed cost heterogeneity is
motivated by empirical and anecdotal evidence, and its algebraic ease. Additionally, one
of this model’s key contributions is it allows for asymmetric changes in trade restrictions.
This paves the way for exploration of strategic trade policy and trade agreement in the
context of the frontier of trade theory. In this vein of trade policy, I show that not all trade
restrictions are created equally, that is the eﬀects of changes in iceberg transport costs is not
necessarily isomorphic to changes in an ad valorem tariﬀ. These diﬀerences along with the
eﬀect of changes in the often overlooked beachhead costs have important policy implications.
For instance, I ﬁnd that for a government to maintain the number of varieties in the face
of rising transport costs, it is not always the case a decrease in tariﬀs is called for. The
method in which we model trade restrictions has important implications and needs to be
implemented in models with greater care.
APPENDIX
A The Pricing Scheme of an Exporter
Proposition A1. Given monopolistic competition and a continuum of ﬁrms, a tariﬀ is
completely passed through onto the foreign consumers.




𝑡?𝑝?(?)??(?) − ??(?) − 𝜏?𝑝?(?)??(?) − 𝗾𝑓(?) (A-1)













































































which is the same constant markup as the domestic ﬁrm and means the tariﬀ is completely
passed through to the consumer.
B Moving from Autarky to Trade
B.1 Heterogeneous Firm Proﬁts
































Proposition B1. The gain in proﬁt for the most eﬃcient ﬁrm from opening to trade is
ambiguous.


















If I evaluate (B-3) at the iceberg transport cost that is suﬃcient to insure Autarky (𝜎𝗼𝜀 =
𝑓(?𝐴
𝐷)


















































































will be negative and the most eﬃcient ﬁrm will gain from opening to a “small” amount of
trade if and only if
𝗿(?
𝐴






This condition will hold for any ﬁxed cost mapping in which 𝑓′(0) = 0. For instance if 𝑓(?)
takes the form of a power function 𝑓(?) = 𝜂?𝑛+𝜆 where 𝜂 > 0, 𝜆 ≥ 0, and 𝑛 > 1, then (B-4)





































































𝐷 + 𝜆 + 𝗾𝜆2 > 0
Thus the eﬀect trade has on overall ﬁrm proﬁts is ambiguous and depends on the functional
form of 𝑓(?).
B.2 Welfare Eﬀects
Again, for notational ease, I will drop the country labels. This only holds because I am
investigating symmetric changes in transport costs.
Proposition B2. A country will experience an increase in welfare from trade.
Proof. The indirect utility function for a country is
? = 𝜇ln(?𝑥) + 𝐼 − 𝜇 (B-5)
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where 𝑠(?󺱘) is the propensity to consume the heterogeneous good. Quasilinear utility implies































































− ?𝑋 < 0
Therefore, a country will gain welfare when transport costs are reduced.
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